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PROCEDURAL DEVICES FOR SIMPLIFYING LITIGATION
STEMMING FROM A MASS TORT
A ship explodes in harbor, a dam breaks, a trestle collapses under the weight
of a train, fire envelops a circus tent--each of these accidents may cause
extensive loss of life, personal injury, and property damage. Hundreds or
thousands of suits resulting from such a "mass tort" are usually instituted in the
ensuing days of confusion.' Both claimants and defendants may find them-
selves in a litigatory jungle. If there is more than one possible defendant, the
issue of ultimate responsibility may be bandied to and fro among the alleged
tort-feasors.2 Insurance companies may be subrogated into the legal free-for-
all.3 Judgments against some defendants will not bind others.4 And where
the United States is a defendant, a state court's judgment cannot bind it at
all. 5
Even when there is only one defendant, trial strategy may prompt some
plaintiffs to sue in federal court or in states other than the one in which the
tort was committed." Consequently, litigation of issues arising from a "mass
tort" may proceed in many jurisdictions at once.1 This process is time-con-
suming and costly.s Different courts, both state and federal, may reach diver-
1. In one ship explosion case about three hundred suits were brought by approxi-
mately eighty-five hundred claimants. In re Texas City Disaster Litigation. 197 F.2d
771 (5th Cir. 1952), aff'd sub nora. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In
another explosion case, death, injury, or damage was caused to some eight thousand persons.
About two years after the accident some seven thousand claims had been filed. Pennsyl-
vania R.R. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1953). In a case involving a dam
break, 712 actions were filed, involving some three thousand claims. Clark v. United
States, 13 F.R.D. 342 (D. Ore. 1952).
2. See, e.g., In re Texas City Distaster Litigation, supra note 1; Pennsylvania
R.R. v. United States, smpra note 1.
3. See In re Texas City Distaster Litigation, supra note 1; Metropolitan Casualty
Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 94 N.J.L. 236, 109 Ati. 743 (Ct. Err. & App.
1920) ; communication to the YA. L.w Joumz.u. from Stuart NV. Thayer of Covington
& Burling, Washington, D.C.. counsel for the plaintiff in the Texas City litigation bhfore
the Supreme Court, dated April 15, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
4. It is the general rule that a judgment binds only the impleaded parties and their
privies. McCollum v. Smith, 233 N.C. 10, 62 S.E2d 4S3 (1950). See also note 29 in ra.
5. The Federal Tort Claims Act specifically grants to the federal district courts
sitting without a jury and subject to the Rules of Civil Prucedure, exclusive original
jurisdiction over all tort claims which the Act permits to be instituted against the United
States. 60 STAT. 842, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).
6. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. SO (D.N.J. 1953). See
also note 8 infra.
7. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, stpra note 6.
S. See First State Bank v. Chicago, R.L & P.R.R., 63 F2d 85, 590 (Sth Cir. 1933)
("The avoidance of unnecessary suits should be much desired by litigants and taxpayers.")
Also see note 1 supra.
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gent decisions. Conflicts of law questions are presented. Test cases may be
carried to the highest accessible courts.Y0 Many legal theories will be espoused.
Through this melange of litigation, plaintiffs must thread their way to success
or failure, while defendants do battle on all fronts."
Defendants especially desire to avoid extensive litigation. In any case the
proclivity of juries to favor plaintiffs augurs ill for defendant's victory.1'2 And
in mass tort situations, the expense of litigating a multitude of claims over a
wide geographic area may force settlement whenever possible. Defendants
therefore seek to simplify their task by having claims consolidated. 13
Plaintiffs, however, may object to consolidation. Many claimants will pre-
fer to bring their actions separately. 14 To be sure, consolidating would cut
9. In one instance, a number of actions for damage and injury arose out of an ex-
plosion. In Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Burrows, 77 Ark. 74. 96 S.V. 336 (1905), the court
sustained a verdict against the oil company. But in Waters-Pierce Oil Co v. Kiiisel, 79
Ark. 608, 96 S.W. 342 (1906), arising out of the same accident but in which the facts
were more fully developed than in the Burro-zs case, the court granted judgnent for
the oil company. See also Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Van Elderen, 84 Ark. 555, 106 S,W.
947 (1907).
10. E.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
11. Maintenance of public good will may lead a defendant to settle claims against it,
even where its liability is in doubt. Nevertheless, the amount of individual damages may
be litigated if the sum demanded appears to be excessive. And litigation of all claims may
be required if the defendant's assets are insufficient to cover the aggregate amount of the
claims filed.
12. See James, Function of Judge and Jurwy in Negligence Cases, 59 YAI.E L.J. b07,
686-7 (1949). The tendency of juries to favor the plaintiff may result from the fact that
most people believe that the large corporation is adequately insured through outside in
surers or is self-insured. Thus they may resolve all doubts in favor of the individual and
against the impersonal entity. This factor is important in any discussion of mass tort,.
since the majority of defendants in such situations are large corporations, municipalities,
states, or the Federal Government.
13. Consolidation is used at this juncture to mean any procedure for simplification
of multiple suits into one proceeding. The term may also be used to denote a specific
procedure for joining separate actions by multiple claimants. See pages 516-19 infra.
In its most technical sense, consolidation refers to the union of two causes of action
brought by the same plaintiff against the same defendant. See Fire Ins. Co. v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 4 F. Supp. 25, 29 (E.D. Ky. 1933).
14. Or if he chooses, the plaintiff may in many instances intervene in an action which
has already been instituted. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24; Cameron v. The President & Fellows
of Harvard College, 157 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1946) ; Champ v. Atkins, 128 F.2d 601 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) ; Knapp v. Hankins, 106 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. I1. 1952).
But in the tort situation, intervention will be at the court's discretion, absent a statute
which makes it a right. In such a situation, intervention is usually denied when the adjudi-
cation of the original parties' rights will be unduly prejudiced or delayed thereby. Allen
Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 (1944).
Where permissive intervention is allowed, it is necessary for the would-be intervenor
to meet jurisdictional requirements. See, e.g., Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 374
(W.D. Ark. 1953) ; Tachna v. Insuranshares Corp., 25 Supp. 541 (D. Mass. 1938). Con-
cerning the relationship of the right of intervention to the amount in controversy, see
4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 24.18 (2d ed. 1950) (hereinafter cited as MooRP).
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each plaintiff's expenses, and it might hasten recovery. But any such pro-
cedure is fraught with danger. A trial involving a maze of claims might well
confuse a jury. Evidence admissible against one claimant, but not against
another, might be considered by the jury in determining both claims.la The
claimant might get an award smaller than the one he would receive if the jury
heard his claim separately.",i A consolidation procedure which utilizes repre-
sentative suits poses additional problemsY1 The few who litigate on behalf
of the many may be represented by counsel who will not prepare the best
possible case.' 8 The suits may be collusive.19 And a non-litigating plaintiff
may wish to rely on a legal theory or a set of facts which his representatives
ignore but which might be successful.
It is difficult to force unwilling claimants to participate in a procedure for
consolidation. In order to limit litigation by producing decisions binding on
all claimants, a method of consolidation must operate within constitutional,
statutory, and doctrinal confines. The major obstacles are three: jury trial,
service of process, and jurisdiction.
The right to jury trial 2' is important because historically some of the
methods for dealing with multiple actions have required the aid of normally
jury-less courts of equity.2 ' The right to trial by jury is a continuation of the
right as it existed prior to the adoption of the federal and the various state
constitutions.2 2 Consequently, in the absence of waiver, a present-day court sit-
ting without a jury may try only those cases which were triable without a jury be-
fore the enactment of the constitutions, or which involve remedies or claims un-
15. See CH.AFEE, SO F PROBi.EM S OF EQUITY 152 (1q50) (hereinafter cited a.
CHAFEE).
16. See note 82 infra.
17. For a discussion of representative suits, see text at note 110 el seq. infra.
18. See Honvood v. Statesman Pub. Co., 93 L.J.K.B. 450, 456 (1929). See also
CHAFEE 227; note 187 infra.
19. See Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 38, 5 (1903). But see Kalven
& Rosenfield, The Contemporary Finction of the Class Suit, 8 U. or CHI. L. Rmz. 684,
713 (1941).
20. U.S. Coxsr. AmNxD. VII. State constitutions also guarantee jury trial. See,
e.g., Tillery v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Anniston, 241 Ala. 653, 655-6, 4 So2d 125, 127
(1941).
21. E.g., First State Bank v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R.. 63 F.2d 585 (Sth Cir. 1933)
(bill to restrain a multitude of suits against the plaintiff). Juries have generally been
unavailable in equity courts. E.g., Conrocode v. Ohio Bell Tel. Cu., 11 F.R.D. 303 (N.D.
Ohio 1951) ; Ford v. Palisades Corp., 101 Cal. App. 2d 491, 225 P.2d 545 11950) ; Runyan
v. Bangs, 167 Kan. 691, 208 P.2d 600 (1949).
juries may be unavailable in equity cvten where law and equity have Leen nicrgcd. Se,
Hasty v. Pierpont, 146 Kan. 517, 72 P.2d 69 (1937). This may depend, how:ever, upon
whether the action is equitable in nature. Bettencourt v. Bank of Italy, 216 Cal. 174, 13
P.2d 659 (1932).
22. E.g., Hoehamer v. Village of Elmwood Park, 3Stl I11. 422, 198 N.E. 345 (1935);
People v. Kelly, 347 Ill. 91, 179 N.E. 898 (1931); McMaster v. WilkinFon, 145 Neb. 39,
15 N.W.2d 348 (1944) ; White v. White, 10s Tex. 57u, lt% S.W. 50,4 11917); LaBu\e
v. Balthazor, 180 Wis. 419, 193 N.W. 244 (1923).
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like any known at that time.m This fact does not in itself present insurmountable
difficulties in finding methods of dealing with mass torts. 24 But apart from con-
stitutional considerations, American judicial policy has disfavored negligence
trials by a court without jury.2 5 It seems unlikely that this tradition will be broken
cavalierly for the sake of the defendant's convenience in mass tort litigation .
2
23. Causes unknown at time of constitutional adoption: Welchel v. McDonald, 340
U.S. 122 (1950), rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 923 (1951) (action against United States) :
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) (same); Ryan Distributing Corp. v.
Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (action for declaratory judgment) ; McLachlan
v. McLachlan, 101 Cal. App. 106, 281 Pac. 512 (1929) (divorce action) ; Breimhorst v.
Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949) (proceedinq before administrative
agency).
Causes triable without jury at tine of constitutional adoption: In re England's Estate.
214 Cal. 298, 5 P.2d 428 (1931) (probate) ; Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank, 121
Conn. 388, 185 Atl. 82 (1936) (same). See also Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L... 551 (1937);
Notes, 56 HARv. L. REv. 282 (1942); 13 So. CALIF. L. REv. 170 (1939). But cf. Dallas
Joint Stock Land Bank v. State, 133 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (independent
suit in nature of a bill of discovery [a remedy which apparently was not known at time
of adoption of state constitution] warrants jury trial) ; Tolle v. Tolle, 101 Tex. 33, 104
S.W. 1049 (1907) (in an action involving the granting of letters of administration, the
court decided that--even though that cause was unknown at common law-the right to
jury trial existed, since a probate proceeding was a "cause" within meaning of Art. 5 § 10
of the Texas constitution). Also see Harris, Jury Trial in Civil Cases-A Problem in
Constitutional Interpretation, 7 SOUTHW STrR, L.J. 1 (1953).
24. See text at note 100 et seq. infra.
The constitutional guarantee of the right to trial by jury does not necessarily pre-
clude equity from assuming jurisdiction in order to avoid a multitude of actions at law.
First State Bank v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 63 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1933) ; Weininger v.
Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co., 359 Ill. 584, 195 N.E. 420 (1935). But see Murphy & Sons,
Inc. v. Peters, 95 N.H. 275, 276, 62 A.2d 718, 719 (1948).
25. "[T]here is a strong popular feeling in this country that negligence suits should
be tried by a jury. This is based on the belief that judges would be more favorable than
juries to the large corporations which are commonly defendants in such cases. Whether
this belief is founded in fact or not, it can not be ignored, for it is important, not only
that the people should get justice, but also that they should feel that they are getting
justice." CHAFM 186-7 (1950).
In simple negligence cases, courts grant the right to jury trial. Bouis v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 98 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. La. 1951) (negligence action for faulty
firearm) ; McGregor v. Wright, 117 Cal. App. 186, 3 P.2d 624 (1931) (malpractice
action); Morgan v. Tennessee Cent. Ry., 31 Tenn. App. 409, 216 S.W.2d 32 (1948)
(wrongful death); Leary v. Fisher, 248 Mich. 574, 227 N.W. 767 (1929) (negligence
in operation of automobile) ; Lawrence v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 167 Kan. 45, 204
P.2d 752 (1949) (same).
26. Where there is an assertion of doubtful equity jurisdiction, doubts are resolved
by declaring the action to be at law. Pankey v. Ortiz, 26 N.M. 575, 195 Pac. 906 (1921) ;
Likowski v. Catlett, 130 Okla. 71, 265 Pac. 117 (1928); accord. Peterson v. Sucro, 93
F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1938).
Such is not the case, however, where monetary damages are merely incidental to re-
quested equitable relief. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937):
Jamaica Savings Bank v. M. S. Investing Co., 274 N.Y. 215, 8 N.E.2d 493 (1937).
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It is a policy which will certainly restrict any proffered solution, as it has
restricted solutions in the past.27
The second obstacle is the right to service of process or "notice." Consti-
tutionally, the decision in an in personam action, such as the usual tort suit,
cannot bind a person who has not received personal service of process or its
equivalent.28 Therefore, a mass tort claimant cannot be bound by the decision
in a representative suit of which he has received no notice. -9 By federal
rule, personal service in most in personam actions is valid only in the state in
which the district court sits."° Some state courts have no power to issue pro-
27. See note 103 infra.
28. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
29. See Keffee, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Co.-.-EL L.Q. 327, 44-50
(1948): Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 19, at 713; Comment, 46 (,L. L Rv. 818
(1946).
Mfany representative actions involve a res to which several indisiensible parties are
asserting claims. Then a conclusive decree may be given without affs rding proper notice
to all interested parties. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 3.5h (1921);
Smith v. Swormstead, 16 How. 28 3 (U.S. 1853) ; Montgomery v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc'y, 83 F2d 758 (7th Cir. 1936) (persons not in being bound by a deeree I: Luster
v. Martin, 58 F.2d 537 (7th Cir.), cert. den fcd, 2 7 U.S. 637 (1932) (crcdit.r's bill);
WVaybright v. Columbian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 235 (W.D. Tenn. 1939);
Southern Ornamental Iron Works v. Morrow, 101 S.W.2d 336. (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)
(action against members of a reciprocal insurance company to rtcjver lirminlum 1.
The great danger, however, in foregoing or relaxing service t-f proe" requirements
is that the supposed class may consist of members %vhose interests may conflict as among
themselves. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). A partial answer to this
problem is that the decree in many situations, binds only those parties .'%Io assvnt to the
litigation in their behalf. See note 136 infra. In addition, in a representative oor clas"
action, there is the requirement that there be adequate representation. It hs been argued
that it would be contradictory to say that there is adequate representatin of a class
within which there exist antagonistic or conflicting interests. Linden Land Co. v. Mil-
waukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 107 Wis. 493, 83 N.W. 851 (1900). Also see Kalven
& Rosenfield, supra note 19 at 711.
In certain instances, courts have made a decree binding on all members of the class if
they are convinced that there has been proper notice-even though there has not beeen the
traditional service of process. Women's Catholic Order of Foresters Y. City of Ennis,
116 F2d 270 (5th Cir.), cert. dcnicd, 313 U.S. 5S9 (1941) ; Towle v. Donnell, 49 F2d 49
(6th Cir. 1931) ; Phipps v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 284 Fed. 945 (th Cir.), ecr. grantcd,
261 U.S. 611: writ of error disimissed, 262 U.S. 762 (1923); Throcknirton v. Hicman,
279 Fed. 196, 201-02 (3d Cir. 1922); Hefferman v. B ennet & Armour, 110 Cal. Apj'. 2d
564, 590, 243 P.2d 846, 862 (1939) ; American State Savings Bank, TrutLe v. American
State Savings Bank, 288 Mich. 78, 284 N.W. 652 (1932). Professor Mv ,re criticizes this
practice, declaring that "such an 'analysis' seems, at most, to be relegating the entire
doctrine to the haphazardous concept of 'fireside equity.' Only cu.nfusiun has resulted in
such a criterion." 3 MoRE 3470. For a contrary view, see Cnient, .46 CiL L. R4.
818, 833 i.68 (1946).
30. Federal Rule 4(f) provides that "all process other than a subpoena may be served
anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held, and
when a statute of the United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits *,f that
state... .." FE. R. Civ. P. 4(f), .Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 433 (194b 1.
"Congress has undoubted power to authorize a suit under federal law to be brought in any
United States district court, and to provide that process may run into any part of the
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cess to someone in a county other than the one in which an in personam action
is begun. 31 And due process is not satisfied by service by publication--or other
constructive service-issued to persons not resident in the jurisdiction.8 2 Con-
structive service is permissible only when it is the sole means by which to give
residents notice of a suit to which they are necessary and proper parties.83
A legislature may in no case authorize a method of notification which in fact
gives no notice at all.3 4 Furthermore, service by mail is impracticable in the
mass tort situation, because many potential plaintiffs may be unknown.85 Early
cases allowed one party to accept service for another if the parties were in
"privity." 36 But the mere fact that the parties have a common interest in a
United States, but it has not done so by general law." Howard v. United States, 126 F.2d
667, 668 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 699 (1942). See also 2 Moom, ff 4.29; 2 id.
1 4.19 (discussion concerning service on an individual pursuant to state law).
Those statutes which authorize service of process on a defendant in any district where
defendant resides or transacts business have almost uniformly been interpreted as not
applying to third party defendants. United States v. Rhoades, 14 F.R.D. 373 (D. Colo.
1953).
31. Valentine v. Franklin Surety Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 822, 168 Atl. 35 (1933); Deaton
v. Evans, 192 Tenn. 348, 241 S.W.2d 423 (1951) ; Walden v. Locke, 33 S.W.2d 475 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930).
This is not the case if the action is in rem or if permission is granted by a constitu-
tional or statutory provision. Williams v. Cooper, 222 N.C. 589, 24 S.E.2d 484 (19-13) ;
State ex rel. Hawley v. Industrial Comm., 64 Ohio App. 271, 28 N.E.2d 654, aft'd, 137
Ohio St. 332, 30 N.E.2d 332 (1940) ; Hall v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 122 W.
Va. 188, 9 S.E.2d 45 (1940).
32. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A. v. Smoot, 152 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Bank of
Edwardsville v. Raffaelle, 381 Ill. 486, 45 N.E.2d 651 (1942); Southern Mills v. Arm-
strong, 223 N.C. 495, 27 S.E.2d 281 (1943) ; Sheehan v. Mathews, 258 Wis. 006, 46
N.W.2d 752 (1951).
Quasi in ren jurisdiction may be established, however, if the non-resident defendant has
property in the state. Southern Mills v. Armstrong, supra; Indemnity Ins, Co. of N.A.
v. Smoot, supra.
33. Bray v. Germain Inv. Co., 105 Colo. 403, 98 P.2d 993 (1940); Dixie Meadows
Independence Mines Co. v. Kight, 150 Ore. 395, 45 P.2d 909 (1935) ; In re Bergman's
Survivorship, 60 Wyo. 355, 151 P2d 360 (1944). Statutes which provide for construc-
tive service must be complied with strictly. Southern Mills v. Armstrong, 223 N.C. 495,
27 S.E.2d 281 (1943) ; Erickson v. Macy, 231 N.Y. 86, 131 N.E. 744 (1921). For service
by publication to be binding on unknown persons, in those situations in which such service
is permitted, every effort must be made to ascertain the names and addresses of unknown
parties. Callner v. Greenberg, 376 Ill. 212, 33 N.E.2d 437 (1941).
34. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Wuchter
v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13, 24 (1928) ; Horvath v. Brettschneider, 131 Misc. 618, 227 N.Y.
Supp. 109 (City Ct. 1928).
See generally Eulette, Service of Process Upon Foreign Corporations-Constiutional
Limitations Imposed by Judicial Construction of the Due Process Clause, 20 CHI-KENT L.
Rv. 287 (1942); Notes, 39 YALE L.J. 126 (1929); 25 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 896 (1950); 12
So. CALIF. L. REV. 464 (1939).
35. Even if the parties were known, such service would not be valid as against non-
residents. Doctor's Hospital v. Kahal, 155 Misc. 126, 277 N.Y. Supp. 736 (City Ct.),
aff'd' - App. Div. -, 277 N.Y. 738 (1st Dep't 1934).
36. See text at note 61 infra.
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question of law or fact does not establish such "privity."a3 , Hence, the doc-
trine affords little help in mass tort litigation.38 Since mass torts character-
istically involve claimants residing in several jurisdictions, service of process is a
troublesome requirement.
The final obstacle to consolidation of mass tort litigation is jurisdictional.
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction ;3 the Constitution limits the contro-
versies they may hear.41 And "at no time has Congress granted to the Federal
Courts the full measure of power which it was authorized to grant by Article
III of the Constitution.1 41 Moreover, Congress has provided 42 that a federal
court may not issue an injunction to stay a concurrent state proceeding except
where authorized by statute,43 or where restraint is necessary to preserve its
jurisdiction 44 or to protect or effectuate its judgment.45 Either a state or
37. Holt Mfg. Co. v. Collins, 154 Cal. 265, 97 Pac. 516 (1903).
At common law, a voluntary unincorporated group or association could not be sued in
its common name. Absent an enabling statute, individual process had to be served on
the members. Johnston v. Albritton, 101 Fla. 1-85, 134 So. 563 (1931). See also 94 A.L.R.
854 (1935). For an example of an enabling statute, see J. Earl Jardine v. Superior Court,
213 Cal. 301, 303-5, 2 P.2d 756, 757-8 (1931).
38. There may, however, be "privity" in the mass tort situation, where the actiun
concerns a common fund to which a class of claimants have joint and inseverable rights.
See text at note 86 infra.
39. See, e.g., Shulman & Jaegerman, Somne Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal
Procedure, 45 YA. L.J. 393 (1936).
40. See U.S. CoxsT. ART. III. The following are situations in which Congress has
given the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction: Grand River Dam Authority v. Parker,
40 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Okla. 1941) (cminunt domain) ; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503
(1944) (Emergency Price Control Act except § 205); Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynchl, Pierce.
Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (Securities and Exclatige \ct, ; Wil.
liamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 27 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1939) (antitrust);
Cavicchi v. Mohawk Mfg. Co., 34 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 194t) (patent infringement).
Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with state courts in diversity cases, 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. 1952), or if so provided by a congressional statute. Werbe V. Holt,
98 F. Supp. 614, 617 (W.D. Ark. 1951) ; Hargrave v. M[id-Continent Pet. Corp., 36 F.
Supp. 233 (E.D. Okla. 1941) (Fair Labor Standards Act).
In personam actions may run concurrently. Princess Lida of Thum and Taxis v.
Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939) ; Pennsylvania Gen. Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S.
189 (1935); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Rankin v. Iron City
Sand & Gravel Corp., 356 Pa. 548, 52 A.2d 455 (1947).
41. Shulman & Jaegerman, supra note 39, at 394-5.
42. 62 STAT. 968 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (Supp. 1952).
43. This power can be utilized where the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
See note 40 supra. See also Moonefs COMMENTARY " THE UNIrr STATEs JuDIcIAL CoD&
410 (1949).
44. See Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. M6 (1922) ; Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 134-7 (1941). The most common cases of this type are the
so-called "res" cases. See Mandeville v. Canterbury, 313 U.S. 47 (1943) ; Bryant v. At-
lantic Coast Line R.R., 92 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1937); Jennings & Co. v. Buterbaugh, 89
F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Pa. 1950). See also Warren, Federal a:d State Court Interfcrence,
43 HA.v. L. R v. 345, 359-66 (1930). For additional information on the scope of this
exception, see Mooma, op. cit. snpra note 43, at 411-14.
45. See Jackson v. Carter Oil Co., 179 F.2d 524 (10th Cir.), cert. deied, 340 US.
1954]
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federal court may stay a proceeding before it, pending determination of the
same issues in another court.46 And a state court can restrain parties over
which it has jurisdiction from prosecuting actions in another state.47 But the
jurisdiction of state courts is limited by the fact that they may not interfere
with foreign in personam actions by issuing an order or decree directed to a
court in another state.48 In sum. no court, state or federal, can enjoin a tort
action in a jurisdiction other than its own, unless the action has been brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.49 This principle of limited jurisdiction
is important in multiplicity situations since tort actions, transitory in nature,
may be instituted against a defendant in any jurisdiction in which he can be
found.5 0 And the fact that a claimant can sue a corporation in any state in
812 (1950): Maryland Casualty Co. v. Glassell-Taylor & Robinson, 68 F. Supp. 897
(W.D. La. 1946).
46. Generally, a federal court will stay proceedings out of comity, where trial has
already begun in state court, where a decision has been reached and is being appealed,
or where state court jurisdiction is in issue. Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326
U.S. 620, 677 et seq. (1946) ; Klanian v. New York Life Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 777 (D.R.I.
1941).
Federal courts will not, however, stay an in personan; action just because of a pending
action in state court; if the jurisdictional requirements are met, a plaintiff is considered
to have an absolute right to proceed in the federal courts. See Township of Hillsborough
v. Cromwell, supra; Great North Woods Club v. Raymond, 54 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1931).
For examples of state conflict problems, see Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387, 389
(1933); White v. Central Dispensing & Emergency Hospital, 99 F.2d 355, 362 (D.C.
Cir. 1938) ; Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932). In such instances,
courts generally require that the suits involve the same parties, and the same subject
matter. Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 119, 214 P.2d 844 (1950) ; Evans
v. Evans, 186 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
47. The injunction will generally be honored in the second state on grounds of comlty.
Hall v. Milligan. 221 Ala. 233, 128 So. 438, 440 (1930) ; New Orleans & N.E.R.R. v.
Bernich, 178 La. 153, 150 So. 860 (1933). Contra: Pitcairn v. Drummond, 216 Ind. 54,
56, 23 N.E.2d 21, 22 (1939); Boston & M.R.R. v. Whitehead, 307 Mass. 106, 108, 29
N.E.2d 916, 917 (1940) ; Evans v. Morrow, 234 N.C. 600, 604, 68 SX.2d 258, 261 (1951).
The "full faith and credit" clause does not require that the injunction be honored. Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. Reddick, 202 Ark. 393, 395-6, 150 S.W.2d 612, 614 (1941); Sullivan v.
McFetridge, - Misc. -, 55 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Supp. Ct. 1945).
48. Husband v. Crockett, 195 Ark. 1031, 115 S.W.2d 882 (1938) ; Morad v. Williams,
177 Misc. 933, 32 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1942); New York, C. & St. L.R.R. v. Mat-
zinger, 136 Ohio St. 271, 25 N.E.2d 349 (1940). See also Miles v. Illinois Central R.R.,
315 U.S. 698, rehearing denied, 316 U.S. 708 (1942) (action under Federal Employers'
Liability Act).
Instituting a proceeding in one county is not a bar to an action in another county of
the same state, but the second court may refuse jurisdiction on grounds of comity. Peaslee
v. Miller, 119 Misc. 452, 193 N.Y. Supp. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1923). But cf. Suit v. Gilbert,
148 Fla. 421, 4 So.2d 463 (1941) ; In re Hange's Estate, 219 Minn. 192, 17 N.W.2d 305
(1945) ; Petition of Herl, 230 Wis. 312, 284 N.W. 42 (1938).
49. 60 STAr. 812 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1946). This act grants exclusive juris-
diction to the federal district courts; see note 127 infra.
50. Draper v. Louisville & N.R.R., 348 Mo. 886, 156 S.W.2d 626 (1941) ; Southern
Pacific Co. v. Allen, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 66, 106 S.W. 441 (1907). But ef. Mowat v. United
Fruit Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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which it does business 5 practically guarantees that claims resulting from a
mass tort will crop up in several forums.
The defendant's desire to restrict litigation, the claimant's interest in pro-
curing an individual hearing, and the legal obstacles to consolidation must all
be considered in an analysis of the procedural devices presently available fior
limiting litigation resulting from a mass tort. These devices-the class action,
consolidation of actions, the bill of peace, and in exceptional cases receivership
proceedings-were formulated more with an eye toward contract litigatioln,
2
Although infrequently used in the tort field, the procedures have showm the
most promise where injunctive relief is sought? 3 Nevertheless, there is a
history of legal principles for applying such methods to damage claims aris-
ing out of mass torts.--4
THE EQUITABLE BILL OF PEACE
Early English courts of law developed a method for dealing with a multi-
plicity of suits arising out of the same fact situation. In utilizing this device,
known as quasi-consolidation, a law court would stay actions pending against
a defendant--or actions by a single plaintiff against a group of defendantsi--
Then the court would try all common questions uf law and fact in a single
suit.56 But the effectiveness of quasi-consolidation was limited. The decision
in the single suit bound only those who agreed to be boundY7 And a common
law judge, lacking injunctive powers, could stay only those actions pending
in his own court. 5
51. Davis v. Farmers' Co-op Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
The doctrine of forum non convenens may deny plaintiffs access to some fora. Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See also Gooreucu. Co=Fmcrs ir Lw 22-4,
42 (3d ed. 1949).
52. In non-tort litigation, there is more apt to be a res, privity among multiple parties,
or the assertion of joint rights. Cases involving such factors lend themselves readily to a
single determination, without evoking the charge that each person ought to have the right
to litigate his case separately. Cf. text at note 77 in!ra.
53. See text at notes 151 et seq. infra.
54. CAF. x c. 5.
55. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillman, 145 U.S. 285, 292-3 (1892). This would
occur only if the multiple parties were joint obligees or obligors, since these were the only
actions a court of law would join. In England this is no longer the case. See 24) HL% sutuv',
LAWS OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1951), § 94 of which provides that actions may now be con-
solidated where they relate to the same subject matter (1) between the same plaintiff
and defendants, (2) between different plaintiffs and the same defendants, (3) between
the same plaintiffs and different defendants, and, (4) between different plaintiffs and de-
fendants, upon the application of any party. For the present day meaning of the term
"quasi-consolidation" see note 13 supra.
56. See CHAraz 153-4.
57. Id. at 154. M'Gregor v. Horsfall, 3 M. & NV. 320 (1838) ; Hodson v. Richardson,
3 Burr. 1477 (1764) ; see also Journeymen Taylors in Edinburgh v. The Incorporation
of Taylors, 9 Morrison's Dec. 7364 (1770).
58. See note 46 supra.
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To provide a more adequate means of confining litigation of multiple claims,
English equity devised the bill of peace. 9 Through this procedure, as in
quasi-consolidation, one of the multitude sued or was sued on behalf of the
multitude.6' But in addition, the court of equity boasted features which law
could not provide. By entertaining a bill of peace, it could enjoin the parties be-
fore it from bringing separate actions in any court, not just its own.61 Whether
or not they consented, all members of the multitude were bound by the equity
court's decision.6 2 A chancellor, sitting as trier of fact, was better qualified
than a jury to avoid prejudice by considering evidence only when determining
the rights of those parties against whom it was admissible.0 3 And equity could
afford relief no less exhaustive than that available at law." Once its juris-
diction was established, the court could grant not only equitable relief but also
any legal redress necessary to effectuate complete equity among all the in-
terested parties. 5
But equity cannot entertain a bill of peace unless grounds for equity jurisdic-
tion exist."0 In some instances, the separate actions are originally brought in
59. Merrill v. Lake, 16 Ohio 373, 47 Am. Dec. 377 (1847). See also 1 POMERiOY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 246 (4th ed. 1918) ; CIIAFEE 157-9.
60. For examples of cases involving multiple plaintiffs, see Liverpool & London &
Globe Ins. Co. v. Clunie, 88 Fed. 160 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898) ; Ehrlich v. Teague, 209 Ga.
164, 71 S.E.2d 232 (1952) ; Sheffield Waterworks v. Yeomans, L.R. 2 Ch. 8 (1866). See
also National Organization, United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket Consol.
Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927); Conyers v. Lord Abergavenny, I Atk.
*285 (1738).
For examples of cases involving multiple defendants, see Burdick v. Snyder, 69 F.
Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1946) ; National Hairdressers' & Cosmetologists' Ass'n v. Philad Co.,
41 F. Supp. 701 (D. Del. 1941), aff'd, 129 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1942) ; Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Cochrane, 116 N.J. Eq. 190, 172 Atl. 800 (Ch. 1934) ; Mayor of York v. Pilkington,
I Atk. *282 (1737) ; Cowper v. Clerk, 3 P. Wins. 155 (1732).
61. This injunction barred actions both at law and in equity. Erie Ry. v. Ramsey,
45 N.Y. 637, 653 (1871) ; Smith v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 Lea 564 (Tenn. 1880).
See also Cowper v. Clerk, 3 P. Wins. 155 (1732) ; Fitton v. Macclesfield, I Vern. *287
(1684).
62. Sheffield Waterworks v. Yeomans, L.R. 2 Ch. 8 (1866). Also see cases dted
notes 60-1 supra.
63. See CHAFER 155-6, 186-9.
64. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 128 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Burdick v.
Snyder, 69 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1946).
65. But it was always necessary for an action to involve some matter over which
equity traditionally had jurisdiction before it would grant legal relief. Ind, Coope & Co.
v. Emmerson, 56 L.J. Ch. 989 (1887) ; Ware v. Horwood, 14 Ves. *27, 33 (1807); How
v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, 23 Eng. Rep. 277, 1 Vern. *22 (1681); Natural Gas Pipe
Line Co. v. FPC, 128 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Ehrlich v. Teague, 209 Ga. 164, 71 S.E.2d
232 (1952) ; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Cochrane, 116 N.J. Eq. 190, 172 At1. 800 (Ch.
1934).
66. Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 1 Atk. *282 (1737); Smith v. Bivens, 56 Fed. 352
(C.C.D.S.C. 1893); Boston & M.R.R. v. Sullivan, 177 Mass. 230, 58 N.E. 689 (1900),
Smith v. Smith, 148 Mass. 1, 18 N.E. 595 (1888) ; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Cochrane,




equity. Then, since the court has had jurisdiction from the beginning, it can issue
the bill of peace without finding further grounds for equitable intervention. 6 - But
in the mass tort situation-and many others-all of the separate suits begin
as pure actions at law for damages. Before it will wrest the litigation away
from law, equity must be shown a reason for granting equitable relief.GS And
in such a situation, equitable intervention is permissible, not mandatory.6
Early English cases held that the mere fact of multiplicity was sufficient to
render legal redress inadequate --I and to create a right to equitable interven-
tion through the bill of peace.71 Some shaky American precedent agrees.7-
But for centuries the preponderence of English 73 and American authority7 4
67. CaAFEE 167-70.
68. See cases cited note 66 supra.
69. Hamrick v. Hamrick, 206 Ga. 564, 567-8, 53 S.E.2d 145, 14S (1950) ; Hanson v.
Gardiner, 7 Ves. 306 (1802).
70. Corporation of Carlisle v. Wilson, 33 Eng. Rep. 297, 2nS, 13 Ves. 276, 279 (1807);
Poor v. Clarke, 2 Atk. *515 (1742) (la, inadequate, since in order finally to adjudicate
a question all necessary parties must be before the court). XNare v. Horwood, 14 Ves.
*27, 34-5 (1807). But cf. Ryves v. Wellington, 9 Beav. 579 (1846) (mere absence of
remedy for supposed wrong in another court is not sufficient reason for equity to assume
jurisdiction).
71. Sheffield Waterworks v. Yeomans, L.R. 2 Ch. App. 8 (1866); Pawlet v. Ingres,
23 Eng. Rep. 437, 1 Vern. 0303 (1863); Ware v. Horwood, 14 Yes. *27 (1807); Cowper
v. Clerk, 3 P. Wins. 157 (1732) ; Lord Tenham v. Herbert, 2 Atk *484 (1742). See also
discussion in CnAnam 162-3. Compare How v. Tenants of Brumsgrove, 23 Eng. Rcp. 2o7,
1 Vern. 022 (1681) ; Conyers v. Lord Abergavenny, 1 Atk. 0)85 (1738), uith eases supra.
72. First State Bank v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 63 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1933) ; Fish v.
Kennamer, 37 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1929) ; Munson Inland Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of North
America, 36 F.2d 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) ; Warren Bros. Co. v. Kibbe, 43 F.2d 5320 (D. Ore.
1925); Southern Steel Co. v. Hopkins, 157 Ala. 175, 47 So. 274 (1903); Whitlockr v.
Yazoo & M1. Valley R.R., 91 Miss. 779, 45 So. 861 (1903). But cf. Roanoke Guano Co.
v. Saunders, 173 Ala. 347, 56 So. 198 (1911) ; Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Williamson,
101 Miss. 1, 57 So. 559 (1912).
73. Ewelne Hospital v. Andover, 23 Eng. Rep. 460, 1 Vern. *266 (1634) (requested
relief was more legal in nature than equitable) ; How v. Tenants of Bronsgrm\'e, 23 Eng.
Rep. 277, 1 Vern. 1022 (1681) (privity required); Dilly v. Doig, 2 Ves. 4S6 (1794). See
also 'Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 1 Atk. 0232 (1737) (general right required).
74. Comnwon interest: Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson, 49 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1931);
Watson v. Huntington, 215 Fed. 472 (2d Cir. 1914) ; National Hairdressers' & Cosmetolo-
gists' Ass'n v. Philad Co., 41 F. Supp. 701 (D. Del. 1941), afftd, 129 F2d 1020 (3d Cir.
1942) ; Turner v. Mobile, 135 Ala. 73, 33 So. 132 (1902) ; Morgan v. Morgan, 3 Stev,.
383, 21 Am. Dec. 633 (Ala. 1831) ; Vandalia Coal Co. v. Lawson, 43 Ind. App. 226, 87
N.E. 47 (1909); Stodder v. Rosen Talking Machine Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N.E. 281
(1922) ; Tisdale v. Ins. Co. of North America, 84 Miss. 709, 36 So. 563 (1904) ; Tribette
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 70 Miss. 182, 12 So. 32 (1S92); Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & I.
Co. v. Fain, 109 Tenn. 56, 70 S.V. 813 (1902).
Independent grounds of equitable jurisdiction: First State Bank v. Chicago, IL. &
P.R.R., 63 F.2d 585, 588 (8th Cir. 1933) ; Ehrlich v. Teague, 209 Ga. 164, 17 S.E2d 232
(1952).
Equity has been more willing to assume jurisdiction when a failure t,.. do so %would
necessitate multiple suits between the same two parties. Steggles v. National Discount
1954]
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has required more. Courts have been anxious to restrict equity jurisdiction."a
If the mass litigation is unduly complex, equity courts will refuse jurisdiction,
calling the action multifarious."' And they have deemed it unfair to require a
litigant to have contested in a single complex suit a right which is personal
to him alone.7 7 As a result, there has developed the now-established doctrine
that a bill of peace will be entertained only when multiplicity exists and when a
"common interest" or "general interest" binds the multiple parties together."8
Like many general phrases. "community of interest" affords little predic-
tability.79 Even recourse to history shows only that courts have garbled the
term into an amorphous legal protoplasm. For purposes of analysis, the vari-
ant interpretations can be lumped into two categories: "rigid" definitions and
"liberal" ones.
Proving a community of interest under a rigid rule requires a two-fold
showing. First, the legal right asserted by each one of the multiple parties
against the single party must share a common feature with the rights similarly
asserted by the other multiple parties.8 0 Secondly, that common element must
Corp., 326 Mich. 44, 39 N.W.2d 237 (1949) ; Multiplex Concrete Machinery Co. v. Saxer,
310 Mich. 243, 17 N.W.2d 169 (1945).
75. In Scottish Union, etc. Ins. Co. of Edinburgh v. J. H. Mohlman Co., 73 Fed.
66, 67 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896), the court, in an action by a plaintiff against many different
insurers, remarked that "[I]t's contended that the numerous authorities cited in the brief
warrant the granting of such relief. In the opinion of this Court, however, none of them
go to that length; and if the drift of some be in that direction, it would be a good time
to call a halt .... See also Parkway, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 314 Mass. 647,
650, 51 N.E.2d 436, 438 (1943).
76. Multifariousness has been found in a suit in equity based oil separate claims
against different persons where there is no common right to be established. Burger Lum-
ber Co. v. Kirksey, 203 Ga. 439, 47 S.E.2d 68 (1948). In effect, multifariousness is ant-
other niame for misjoinder of causes of action. See Van Antwerp v. Van Antwerp, 242
Ala. 92, 97, 5 So.2d 73, 77 (1941) ; Stamey v. Fortner, 230 Ala. 204, 205, 160 So, 116, 117
(1935) ; Essen v. Adams, 342 Mo. 1196, 1202, 119 S.W.2d 773, 777 (1938). See also
Schell v. Leander Clark College, 2 F.2d 17, 21 (8th Cir. 1924) : "The vice of multifarious-
ness is the union of causes of action which, or of parties whose claims, it is either im-
practical or inconvenient to adjudicate in a single suit."
A bill, however, is not multifarious merely because all of the defendants are not in-
terested in all the matters contained in a suit. Hastings v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 27 Del.
Ch. 136, 32 A.2d 490 (Ch. 1943) ; Hyde v. Atlanta Woolen Mills Corp., 204 Ga. 450, 50
S.E.2d 52 (1948).
77. CHAFE 152-3, 155.
78. These two phrases have been used interchangeably although there is some indi-
cation that, in their incipiency, their intended connotations were dissimilar. See Newton
v. Egmont, 5 Sim. 130 (1832) ; Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 1. Atk. *282 (1737). See
notes 73, 74 supra.
79. For a general criticism, see 3 MooRE 3417-8; Wheaton, Representative Suits
Inolving Nonerous Litigants, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 399, 407, 433 (1934); Blume, The
"'Cominon Questions" Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 Miclu.
L. REv. 878 (1932).
80. 1 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 59, at 434.
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create a positive legal relationship-or "privitv"-among the members of the
multitude.8 ' The court must find that. apart from the effect of stare decisis,
a decision separately disposing of one claim would determine the validity of
all others.8 2 In essence, it is necessary to find that all of the multiple litigants
would be indispensable or necessary parties to any action brought by any one
of them." If one of the multitude succeeds, all the others would achieve their
objective without further litigation.8 4 Under a rigid definition, "community
of interest" will be found in practice onh' when a common property right,8 5
franchise, or a common fund or trust fund underlies all of the multiple claims.80
Seldom can damage actions springing from a mass tort satisfy such stringent
81. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 115-16 (1897), quoting with approval Cutting v.
Gilbert, 5 Blatchf. 259, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1865).
82. E.g., Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356 (1921); Montgomery Ward v. Langer, 168 F2d 182 (Sth Cir. 194S).
In any case, of course, a prior decision dealing witlh roughly the same facts and legal
issues may be apt to discourage future litigation, but this generally will not hold where
recovery depends largely on factual issues which in turn depend on a multitude of in-
tangibles which affect the jury. Compare Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Van Elderen, 84 Ark.
555, 106 S.W. 947 (1907), with Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Knisel, 79 Ark. 603, 9& S.V.
342 (1906). See also communication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from Mr. R. N. Gilmore,
Jr., Assistant Counsel of Association of Casualty and Surety Companies, dated Novem-
ber 16, 1953, in Yale Law Library: "I recall one airplane accident ... in [which] Earl
Carroll, the famous producer, was killed. The estate of Mr. Carroll, whose annual in-
come at that time was estimated in excess of $1,000,000 recovered nothing. The estates
of others killed in the same crash recovered as much as '220[,000. If the question of
negligence had been controlled by the Carroll case they would have recovered nothing."
83. E.g., Stodder v. Rosen Talking Mach. Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N.E. 251 (1922)
(one of the parties suffered no damage, but the court held that the issuance of the in-
junction was not affected by his presence or absence) ; cf. Zimmerman v. Finkelstein,
230 Mass. 17, 119 N.E. 194 (1918).
84. E.g., Dilly v. Doig, 30 Eng. Rep. 738, 2 Ves. *4S6 (1794) ; Georgia Power Co.
v. Hudson, 49 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1931); Watson v. Huntington, 215 Fed. 472 (2d Cir.
1914); Roanoke Guano Co. v. Saunders, 173 Ala. 347, 56 So. 198 (1911); Turner v.
Mobile, 135 Ala. 73, 33 So. 132 (1902) ; Tribette v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 70 Miss. 182, 12
So. 32 (1892).
85. E.g., Consumers Public Power Dist. v. Eldred, 146 Neb. 926, 936, 22 N.V2d 183,
194 (1946). 'McCollum v. Smith, 233 N.C. 10, 15-16, 62 S.E.2d 483, 487 (1950) ; Kirby
Lumber Corp. v. Southern Lumber Co., 192 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Te. Civ. App.), aff'd, 145
Tex. 151, 196 S.W.2d 387 (1946).
See also Weeks v. Staker, 23 Eng. Rep. 794, 2 Vern. *301 (1693); Arthington v.
Fawkes, 23 Eng. Rep. 824, 2 Vern. *356 (1697) ; How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, 23 Eng.
Rep. 277, 1 Vern. *22 (168), discussed in CHAnE 161. These early actions were in the
nature of a bill to quiet title, an action which has since become a traditionally equitable
action. See 1 PoERmmoy, op. cit. supra note 59, § 248.
86. Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911); Handley v. Stutz,
137 U.S. 366 (1890) ; Shields v. Thomas, 17 How. 2 (U.S. 1854); Natural Gas Pipline
Co. v. FPC, 128 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1942) ; International Shoe Co. v. Picard & Geismer,
Ltd., 30 F. Supp. 570, 577 (E.D. La. 1939), aff'd sub norn. Mayer v. Gros, 116 F24 733
(5th Cir. 1940).
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criteriaY7  Plaintiffs will generally assert claims involving a common legal
question-the defendant's negligence, for instance. But "privity" seldom exists
among such tort claimants. Hence, use of a rigid definition prevents most
mass tort defendants from utilizing the bill of peace.
To alleviate the restrictiveness of a rigid definition, some American courts
have shunned it in favor of a broad construction. Under this "liberal" inter-
pretation, community exists where (1) the claims in dispute between the
multiple parties and the single party have a common origin, and (2) all the
disputes depend upon "common questions" of law and fact." Although this
test insists that the legal relationships between the single party and his multi-
ple opponents share a common legal element, it does not demand that the
multiple parties stand in "privity" to each other.8 9 By thus defining "com-
munity of interest," courts have entertained the bill of peace in mass tort liti-
gation.90
Both rigid and liberal interpretations of "community of interest" can lead
to confusion. Many cases arise in which claimants have a common interest
in some issues, but not in others. Literal reading of a rigid interpretation
would lead to refusal of the bill of peace in such situations, on the ground that
"privity" does not exist among the claimants on all questions presented for
decision.91 In this way, use of the rigid view may deny the bill of peace in
situations where it could be useful and where a tempered kind of "privity"
does exist.
On the other hand, loosely interpreting the liberal view of common interest
may allow the bill of peace to bind multiple parties to an entire decision,
despite the fact that the decision was based on some common and some diverse
questions of law and fact. For instance, if multiple plaintiffs suing for pollution
of a stream are enjoined by a bill of peace and made to abide by one decision,92
either of two things could happen. The court might deny recovery because
87. See note 91 infra.
88. United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18
F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927) ; Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Anderson Co. of Nampa, 42 F. Supp.
917 (D. Idaho 1942); Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Clunie, 88 Fed. 160,
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898).
89. Rodman v. Rogers, 109 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1940); Spear v. H. V. Greene Co.,
246 Mass. 259, 140 N.E. 795 (1923); Kelly v. Tiner, 91 S.C. 41, 74 S.E. 30 (1912);
Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 107 Wis. 493, 83 N.W. 851
(1900). Bul cf. Certia v. University of Notre Dame, 82 Ind. App. 542, 141 N.E. 318
(1923) ; Garfein v. Stiglitz, 260 Ky. 430, 86 S.W.2d 155 (1935) ; Brenner v. Title Guaran-
tee & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.Zd 890 (1937).
90. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co. v. Charles, 258 Fed. 723 (D. Ala. 1919);
Hamilton v. Alabama Power Co., 195 Ala. 438, 70 So. 737 (1915) ; Smith v. Smith, 148
Mass. 1, 18 N.E. 595 (1888).
91. South East Nat. Bank v. Board of Education, 298 Ill. App. 92, 18 N.E.2d 584
(1938) ; cf. Weberpals v. Jenny, 300 Ill. 145, 133 N.E. 62 (1921).
92. See Rodman v. Rogers, 109 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1940) ; Greer v. Smith, 155 App.
Div. 420, 140 N.Y. Supp. 43 (2d Dep't 1913).
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the defendant did not proximately cause the pollution. In that event, the bill
of peace is justified, because the decision depended on the resolution of an
issue which was common to all claimants.03 But the court might deny re-
covery to the representative plaintiff solely because he has shown no injury.
If it then allows the bill of peace to stand, the court denies other claimants the
chance to recover by binding them to the decision-despite the fact that they
might well be able to show injury. The result is to deny claimants any right
to relief.
The foregoing analysis suggests that courts should entertain the bill of peace
readily, but limit its binding effect to questions which are in fact common to
all claimants. The test should be whether determination of an individual issue
in one suit will forestall re-litigation of that issue. 4 But after the common
issues have been resolved, each claimant should be left free to litigate additional
questions-damages, for instance-which are peculiar to him alone. Since.
under bill of peace procedure, the judge sits as trier of fact, he could sort out
the legal issues and specify in his decision which issues he has determined, and
which issues are not common and hence open to further contest.a
Analysis also suggests the advisability in some situations of trying more
than one representative suit under the bill of peace procedure. Suppose, for
instance, that employees and passengers sue a railroad for injuries resulting
from a negligent operation. All the employees have a common interest in the
issue of contributory negligence; the passengers do not. 6 The issue of contribu-
93. Cf. Warren v. Parkhurst, 186 N.Y. 45, 78 N.E. 579 (1905).
94. E.g.. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Clunie, 83 Fed. 160, 167 (C.C.N.D.
Cal. 1898); Stodder v. Rosen Talking Mach. Co., 241 Mass. 245, 249, 135 N.E. 251, 252
(1922): United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18
F.2d 839, 848 (4th Cir. 1927) (in order to permit consolidation, sufficient grounds must
appear that such a practice will promote the convenient administration of justice).
In National Hairdressers' and Cosmetologists' Ass'n v. Philad Co., 41 F. Supp. 701
(D. Del. 1941), aff'd, 129 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1942), the court stated: "The relief granted
to [plaintiff] and those on whose behalf his suit was brought should be completely
effective and obviate the necessity or possibility of suits by [defendant] against members
of the class represented by [plaintiff] based on alleged infringement of [a patent]." Id.
at 708. The court, after declaring the patent invalid, added that: "Suits now pending
brought by the defendant against members [of the class] will be enjoined as will the
bringing of future infringement actions. . . . Such injunctive relief is sanctioned by the
doctrine that a court of equity will act appropriately to prevent a multiplicity of suits."
Id. at 708. Also see test laid down for the assumption of equity jurisdiction in Walker
v. Walker, 330 Mich. 332, 335-6 47 N.W.2d 633, 635 (1951).
95. See text at note 63 et seq. supra.
96. Different degrees of duty may be owed to different claimants. Some may be
invitees, licensees, or trespassers. See James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Lm:d: Duties
Owed to Trespassers, 63 YA.E L.J. 144 (1953). There also may be questions of con-
tributory negligence. In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1951),
aff'd sub no-n. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). See also James, Con-
tributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953); James, Scope of Duly il Neglige:e
Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 778 (1953) ; Morris, Negligence a:d Causation, 101 U. oF PA.
L. Rxv. 1S9 (1952).
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tory negligence is not common to all claimants, but it is common to an identifiable
class of claimants. Instead of refusing to determine the contributory negligence
question, the court of equity should allow two representative suits, one for em-
ployees and one for passengers. Thus the court would isolate the precise issues
of law and make its determination binding only on claimants commonly in-
terested in the issue. Only when this is done can the bill of peace be effective.
97
Apart from the operation of the "common interest" doctrine, the bill of
peace is limited by jurisdictional, jury trial, and service of process doctrines.
The bill was fathered by English equity, which did not have to cope with the
dualism of federal and state jurisdiction. Here, federal courts hold that they
have no power to enjoin state court actions in the mass tort situation. And
a state court injunction can never be effective outside the territorial limits of
the state.99 Hence an American court can entertain a bill of peace only to stay
actions in its own jurisdiction.
Because the bill of peace procedure permits the judge to try issues of fact,100
it may run afoul of jury trial objections. When the bill of peace issues upon
a showing of "common interest," the jury-less trial is probably warranted.
At the time the federal and state constitutions were adopted, equity took juris-
diction in such circumstances. 101 But a mere showing of multiplicity probably
did not evoke equitable intervention at the end of the eighteenth century, and
it certainly did not thereafter.10 2 Hence, an American court, even if it by-
passed the "common interest" doctrine, would face a jury trial objection if it
transferred legal actions to equity solely on the ground of multiplicity.108
The most serious obstacle to use of the bill of peace is the constitutional
requirement of personal service of process. In an in personam action, the de-
fendant must be served. 10 4 Since a bill of peace restrains separate actions, it
97. See Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. C. C. Anderson Co. of Nampa, 42 F. Supp. 917
(D. Idaho 1942).
98. E.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 1.11 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1953).
99. See note 48 supra.
100. See text at note 63 supra. A court of equity may, however, call upon the assist-
ance of a jury to determine issues of fact. Crowell v. City of Riverside, 26 Cal. App. 2d
566, 80 P.2d 120 (1938) ; Commonwealth v. Smith, 344 Pa. 381, 25 A.2d 694 (1942).
In a court system where law and equity are merged, the tort-feasor might file a bill
of peace in equity, but attempt to retain jury trial on the damage suits by simultaneously
beginning an action at law for declaratory judgment. Where this has been done, however,
courts have granted the declaratory judgment but refused to entertain the request for
injunctive relief. See pages 512-13 infra.
101. See notes 73, 74 supra.
102. See cases cited note 74 supra.
103. See Parkway, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 314 Mass. 647, 651, 51 N.E,2d
436, 438 (1943) : "The controlling reason why the boundaries of general equity jurisdic-
tion ought not to be widened by judicial decision beyond those indicated by established
principles, is that the constitutional right of trial by jury would thereby become corres-
pondingly narrowed." Also see Davis v. Forrestal, 124 Minn. 10, 144 N.W. 423 (1913).
But see text at notes 23-4 supra.
104. See note 28 supra.
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would be entertained against claimants in the mass tort situation." :; The defen-
dant who seeks a bill of peace will inevitably find service of process difficult. He
may be unable to serve claimants not resident in the jurisdiction.106 Furthermore,
claimants may remain anonymous until they file complaints. Unquestionably
a bill could be framed to restrain all claimants who file while suit is pending.''-
But one who files after conclusion of the single suit-and hence had no "notice"
of it-could not be barred from bringing a separate action. 0 8 This problem
is insubstantial if most people will file tort claims promptly. But it might be
profitable for a claimant to wait until the common litigation had produced a
judgment. If the judgment were favorable, he could rely on stare decisis to
reap the benefits of it. If the decision were unfavorable, he could attempt to
circumvent any barrier which stare decisis might impose.109 Thus, in any
mass tort case, it seems likely that many claimants will attempt to delay filing
until at least one decision has been rendered.
THE REPRESENTATIVE SUIT: SPURIOUS CLASS AcTIONS
The spurious class action is a second method of simplifying mass litigation
stemming from a single tort.110 Class actions were originally developed to
circumvent the necessity of joining all indispensable members of a large class
by permitting certain members of that class to represent others.1" In these
cases, judgment was binding on all members of the class, whether or not they
105. See text at note 61 supra.
106. See text at notes 28 et seq. supra.
The defendant may, in some instances, serve the claimant's attorney of record. But to
be valid, such service depends on (1) an enabling statute and (2) necessity. Keichner v.
'Mysinger, 84 Tenn. 226, 198 S.W.2d 330 (1946). Compare Zeig v. Zeig, 65 Nev. 464, 193
P.2d 724 (1948).
107. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. C. C. Anderson Co. of Nampa, 42 F. Supp. 917 (D.
Idaho 1942) (federal court enjoined prosecution of state court actions to prevent multi-
plicity as against the defendant insurers on identical policies, where the insurers requested
an adjudication under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act). But cf. Baker Y. Atchi-
son, T. & S.F. Ry., 106 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1939).
103. Albrecht v. Bauman, 130 F.2d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; First Nat. Bank of Florence
v. Edwards, 134 S.C. 348, 132 S.E. 824 (1926).
109. See note S2 suPra.
110. For a general discussion of class actions, see CHAFEE, cc. (1, 7; Blume, The
"Common Questions" Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 MICH.
L. R v. 878 (1932) ; Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit under the Federal Rules
and in Illinois, 42 ILL. L REV. 518 (1947) ; Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 19; Keffee,
Levy & Donovan, spra note 29; Moore, Federal Rules of Ciil Procedure: Some Prob-
lems Ra sed by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551 (1937).
111. In effect, many of the requirements for a class action are the same as those for
the equitable bill of peace. Compare first two cases cited note 89 supra, uith Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F2d 182 (Sth Cir. 1948). But ef. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S.
107 (1897). For the early English cases dealing with this problem, see City of London
v. Richmond, 2 Vern. 421 n.1 (1701). For discussion of the transition betveen the bill of
peace and the representative suit, see ChAFa.E, c. 5; 3 MOO E 3409-14.
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came before the court or had been served with process. 112 Class actions were
also utilized in situations where a common fund or property was in contro-
versy. 13 To insure adequate representation of the class' interests, the court
could allow intervention."
14
Federal Rule 23 codified both of these procedures and added one additional
type of representative suit " 0-- the spurious class action.110 This latter action
is the only kind which can be used in mass tort litigation, and there is some
indication that it was designed specifically with this end in view.111  In sub-
stance, the spurious class action is merely a provision for permissive joinder
of parties-an invitation to those wishing to enter an action to do so.118
112. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) ; Hartford Life Ins,
Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915) ; Smith v. Swormstead, 16 How. 288 (U.S. 1853).
113. E.g., Women's Catholic Order of Foresters v. City of Ennis, 116 F.2d 270 (5th
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 589 (1941). See also Terry v. Little, 101 U.S. 216
(1880).
114. In a true or a hybrid class suit, intervention is generally conditioned on a show-
ing of inadequate representation, FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2). So long as the original plain-
tiff is acting in good faith, the court will ordinarily deny the intervention. New York v.
New York Tel. Co., 261 U.S. 312 (1923); Gross v. Missouri & A. Ry., 74 F. Supp, 242
(W.D. Ark. 1947); Owen v. Paramount Productions Inc., 41 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Cal.
1941). Where there is inadequate representation, however, the right to intervene is un-
questionable. Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 761 (1948); Klein v. Nu-Way Shoe Co., 136 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1943); Innis,
Speiden & Co. v. Food Machinery Corp., 2 F.R.D. 261. (D. Del. 1942); Wolpe v. Poret-
sky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
No problem of intervention should arise in the true class suit because each member of
the class should by the very nature of the action be adequately represented by the plain-
tiffs. In the hybrid action, where specific property is involved, a person with a claim
against that property is usually permitted to intervene. See 3 MOORE, §§ 23.09, 23.11 (4).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) reads as follows:
"(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make
it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will
fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on 'behalf of all, sue or be sued, when
the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
"(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it;
"(2) Several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which
do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
"(3) Several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought."
Rule 23 is not substantially different from former Equity Rule 38, except for the addi-
tion of subsection (a) (3). See Note, 55 YALE L.J. 831 (1946).
116. This name was given to this type of action by Professor Moore. See Moore,
Federal Rides of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25
GEo. L.J. 551 (1.937) ; 3 MOORE § 23.01 et seq. For a criticism of the term, see Kalven &
Rosenfield, supra note 19, at 703 et seq.
117. See 3 MOORE 3443.
118. Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 183 F.2d 685
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By incorporating this procedural device in the federal rule, its proponents
hoped to promote its widespread use as a method of alleviating hardship; in-
dividual litigation is costly in a world where group action dominates many
commercial and social relationships. 9 These hopes, however, have not been
fufilledY-'0 Although the spurious class action is relatively new, the trend of
judicial opinion concerning it has become crystallized to some extent. The
cases have, in the main, drained the action of those features which promised
to make its use in mass tort litigation revolutionary.
The case of Pennsvlvania R.R. v. United States 1 illustrates graphically
the limitations of the spurious class action. There, ammunition temporarily
stored at Perth Amboy exploded, causing death, injury, or property damage
to some eight thousand persons.' -2 The Pennsylvania was implicated as one
of several alleged tort-feasors.2 3 It brought an action for a declaratory judg-
ment to determine its legal responsibility.12 4 It named as defendants a repre-
sentative group of claimants, 2 5 other corporations which might have been re-
sponsible for the explosion,'-" and the United States.'- Prior to this action,
(9th Cir. 1950); Central 'Mexico Light & Power Co. v. Munch, 116 F2d 85 (2d Cir.
1940); Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecon Corp., 9 F.R.D. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
In a spurious class action, no one is bound but the actual plaintiffs. See text at note
137 et seq. infra. Thus it would seem that evyone should be given a right to intervene. There
is, however, no absolute right of intervention. Lockwood v. Hercules Powder Co., 7
F.R.D. 24 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
119. See Keffee, Levy & Donovan, supra note 29; Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 19.
See also Comment, 46 CoL. L. Rrv. 818 (1946). But see 3 Moonr 3470-2.
120. See Kah en & Rosenfield, supra note 19; Keffee. Levy & Dunuvan, supra note 29.
121. 111 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1953).
122. Id. at 03, 85.
123. Id. at 81-2.
124. Id. at 81.
125. Ibid.
126. Possible defendants were identified in a public investigation which followed the
disaster. Brief for Plaintiff in Support of Motion for Order Staying and Enjoining All
Other Pending Actions, p. 1, Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 80 (D.NJ.
1953) (hereinafter cited as PL1AUTirF's BRrEF).
127. Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. "0, 81-2 (D.N.J. 1953).
The Federal Tort Claims Act does not contain any language expressly prohibiting
joinder of the United States with other defendants. Indeed, if anything, the Act's refer-
ence to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would seen to indicate that it was Congress'
intent to permit joinder of defendants. See note 5 sitpra. There may be practical diffi-
culties in permitting a jury trial against the defendants other than the United States, while
the latter is tried solely before the judge. See note 23 supra. However, these administrative
difficulties have not been considered sufficiently formidable to warrant dismissal of the case
of an individual tort-feasor who had been joined xth the United States. Englehardt v.
United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947) ; Bullock v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 445
(D.N.J. 1947) ; Brandt v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 627 (D. Guam 1953).
On the other hand, some courts have not permitted joinder of the United States with
other defendants, influenced no doubt by the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941). There it was held that under the Tucker Act, C9 Stat.
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many separate actions had been instituted in the courts of New Jersey, the
situs of the alleged tort, in courts of other states, and in various federal dis-
trict courts.-28
The case was brought under Federal Rule 23(a)(3), the spurious class
action provision. The railroad requested that the court's adjudication of the
issues be made binding on all known and unknown claimants. 12 9 It also sought
injunctive relief, contending that this was a case in which it was appropriate
for the federal district court to restrain proceedings pending in state and other
federal courts.8 0 The court denied both requests.131
Although the court in the Pennsylvania case propounded a questionable
rationale, "32 it conformed to precedent in refusing to enjoin separate actions.
It is a long standing rule that, in diversity cases, state and federal in parsonam
actions may run concurrently. 133 The only possible authority for restraint is
the federal court's statutory power to stay proceedings in a state court "where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment."'14
But that statute sanctions injunctive relief only when it is "necessary" to preserve
jursidiction or judgment. Courts have taken this to mean that state in personam
proceedings can be enjoined only for the purpose of preventing re-litigation
by the same parties of a controversy already decided in federal court.185 Under
this interpretation, the sole justification for issuing an injunction is to save a
former federal litigant, now defendant in state court, the trouble of pleading
842, 28 U.S.C. § 41(2) (1946), a suit could not be maintained in a district court against
the United States and another defendant. But the jurisdiction which the Tucker Act con-
ferred on the district courts is only concurrent with that of the Court of Claims. And the
Sherwood case involved a contract action. For a criticism of this decision, see 3 MooRE
11807. For examples of cases refusing joinder of defendants under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, see Dickens v. Jackson, 71 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1947) ; Uarte v. United States,
7 F.R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948). See also Drummond v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 730
(E.D. Va. 1948); Donovan v. McKenna, 11 F.R. Serv. 20a.14 Case 3 (D. Mass. 1948).
128. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 111. F. Supp. 80, 83, 85 (D.N.J. 1953).
129. Id. at 84.
130. Id. at 88-9.
131. Id. at 91.
132. The court relied in part on Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941),
27 CORN. L.Q. 270 (1942), 26 MINN. L. REv. 558 (1942), 20 Tl-x. L. Rsv. 621 (1942),
90 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 857 (1942). See also Barrett, Federal Injunctions against Proceed-
ings in State Courts, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 545 (1947). This case was in effect overruled by
Congressional legislation. See note 134 infra. In addition, Toucey involved a distinguish-
able fact situation. See text at note 136 infra.
133. Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. Lyon, 98 F. Supp. 320 (D.D.C. 1951) ; see also
note 40 supra.
134. 62 STAT. 968 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (Supp. 1952); see also note 46 m.pra.
This legislation repudiated the doctrine of Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., mipra
note 132.
135. E.g., Jackson v. Carter Oil Co., 179 F.2d 524 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
812 (1950) ; First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Racine v. Village of Stokie, 173 F2d 1 (7th
Cir. 1949); MOORE'S COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUdiCIAL CODE- 10.03(49) (1949).
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and proving res judicata. 136 Restraint of separate actions brought by a multi-
tude of mass tort claimants is certainly precluded by such a view. Hence, all
available precedent favors the Pennsylzania court's conclusion.
Only the most fragmentary precedent 137 supports the railroad's second con-
tention-that all claimants, including those unknown, should be bound by the
decisions in a spurious class action.138 In fact, such a view seems to ignore
constitutional service of process requirements.'3 9 Mfore frequently, courts have
held such a judgment res judicata as to all parties properly notified of the
suit.140 But even this is minority doctine. Despite some confusion, 14 1 the
overwhelming weight of authority agrees with the Pewsylvania court's holding
that the decision in a spurious class action binds only those parties who have
expressly signified an intent to enter the suit.'4
Because the mass tort defendant can neither have non-assenting claimants
bound by the judgment in a spurious class action nor force them to join the
proceedings, the effectiveness of the procedure is limited. But it may have
some utility. If the defendant can employ it to procure a decision before
related litigation begins, he may discourage other suits or satisfy himself of the
advisability of widespread settlement. 143  For instance, a decision in the
Pennsylvania case that the defendant's acts were not the legal cause of the
explosion might have caused the abandonment of some separate suits. Con-
versely, faced with a decision that it was legally responsible, the railroad
might have chosen to admit liability.144 It could then seek settlement where
possible, or at least restrict future litigation to issues other than liability.
136. For ea-mmples of difficulties which arose prior to the statute, see Toucey v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 112 F.2d 927 (Sth Cir. 1940); Phoeni: Finance Corp. v. Iowa-Wis-
consin Bridge Co., 115 F.2d 1 (Sth Cir. 1940). And those difficulties could not be by-
passed by framing the injunction to restrain the parties, rather than the state court. H.J.
Heinz Co. v. Owens, 189 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 905 (1952).
137. See Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 91 (7th Cir. 1941). There the court
implied that a judgment in a spurious class action would be res judicata as to all mem-
hers of the class, including those who had not assented to the litigation.
138. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 80, 90 (D.N.J. 1953).
139. See notes 29, 30 supra. See also Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 19; Keffee,
Levy & Donovan szpra note 29; CHAurE, cc. 6, 7.
140. See cases cited in last paragraph of note 29 supra.
141. See, e.g., Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir.), rr'y
27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1939), re'd, 311 U.S. 282 (1940), on remand, 39 F. Supp. 592
(E.D. Pa.), rev'd sub novi. Pennsylvania Co. v. Deckert, 123 F2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941).
See also Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
142. Cooper v. Goldsmith, 135 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Albrecht v. Bauman, 130
F.2d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Shipley v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 70 F. Supp. 870
(W.D. Pa. 1947).
For the view that all members of a spurious class should be bound, whether before
the court or not, see authorities cited note 119 mspra.
143. See Communication to the YALE LAw JoURNAL from Mr. Gerald E. Dwyer,
General Attorney, New York Central System, dated November 13, 1953, in Yale Law
Library.
144. Ibid. But see Communication to the YALE LAw JOUIVAL from Mr. Charles Cook
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The glaring inadequacy of the spurious class action appears, however, in
the situation where the defendant has already been sued in several juris-
dictions. Especially if different courts have reached different results, he faces
problems. Presumably, the fact that decisions differ will make the defendant
hesitant to settle claims en masse. Similarly, divergent decisions may do little
to discourage potential plaintiffs. In such an event, the spurious class action
does not lift the defendant out of the morass of multiple litigation.
Some states have adopted statutes patterned after Federal Rule 23.140 In
such jurisdictions, the spurious class action displays the same shortcomings
which attend its use in federal court. And state replicas suffer even more at
the hands of service of process requirements. Not only can unknown claim-
ants keep out of sight, but also known claimants not resident or present in the
jurisdiction are immune from service. 140
States which have not enacted the federal class action statute nevertheless en-
tertain representative suits. A court usually decrees such an action when it finds
that the claimants share a "common interest" and/or that the large number of the
claimants makes it impracticable to join them all. 147 In either case, the judg-
ment normally binds all claimants. 148 This procedure founders on objections
Howell, Vice-President and General Counsel of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company,
dated July 1, 1.953, in Yale Law Library.
145. AiLA. CODE tit. 7, Rule 31 (App. 1940) ; ARiz. CODE ANN. § 21-524 (1939) ; COLO.
R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1941) ; IowA R. Civ. P. 42 (1951) ; N.J. R. Civ. PRuc. 3.23 (1948) ;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-101 (23) (a) (1941); TEx. R. Civ. P. 42 (1941); Micu. CT. R.
16, § 1 (1945).
146. See notes 29-30 supra.
147. The following states employ the "and/or" requirement. ALASIKA ComPn. LAWS
ANN. § 55-3-16 (1949); ARK. DiG. STAT. § 27-809 (1947); CALt CODE CIV. P. § 382
(Deering, 1949); IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-220 (Burns, 1933); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-413
(Corrick, 1949); MINN. STAT. § 540.02 (1945); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 93-2821
(Choate & Wertz, 1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-319 (1943); NEv. Comp. LAWS § 8558
(Hillyer, 1929) ; N.Y. Civ. PR~c. AcT § 195 (1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-70 (1943);
N.D. REV. CODE §28-0208 (1943); OHIO GEN. CODE § 11257 (Page, 1938); OKLA STAT.
A,-,N. tit. 12, § 233 (1938); OR. Comp. LAws ANN. § 9-106 (1940); S.C. CODE § 10-205
(1952) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 104-3-16 (1943) ; WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 190 (Reming-
ton, 1932) ; Wis. STAT. §260.12 (1951) ; Wyo. Co, p. STAT. § 3-616 (1945).
Some states categorically require both common interest and numerous parties. FiA.
STAT. ANN. § 63-14 (1943) ; GA. CODE § 37-1002 (1935).
For a criticism of the common interest test, see 3 MOORE 3417.
148. Swoope v. Darrow, 237 Ala. 692, 188 So. 879 (1939); International Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P.2d 971 (1934); Holthoff v.
State Bank & Trust Co. of Wellston, 208 Ark. 307, 186 S.W.2d 162 (1945); Howard-
Sevier Road Improvement Dist. v. Hunt, 166 Ark. 62, 265 S.W. 517 (1924) ; Tenney v.
Miami Beach, 152 Fla. 126, 11 So.2d 188 (1942); Hopkins v. Jones, 193 Ky. 281, 235
S.W. 754 (1921) ; Kaufman v. Annuity Realty Co., 301 Mo. 638. 256 S.W. 792 (1923);
N.Y. State Railways v. Security Trust Co. of Rochester, 135 Misc. 456, 238 N.Y. Supp.
354 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
But cf. Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Ass'n, 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d
514 (1948); Haese v. Heitzeg, 159 Cal. 569, 114 Pac. 816 (1911). See also More v.
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which have been addressed to the equitable bill of peace.41  Certainly, mass
tort claimants seldom share a "common interest" as most state courts define
that term.15°
Both the class action and the representative suit are more effective where
the relief which claimants seek is an injunction or temporary restraining
order.151 The fact that the federal procedure is permissive in nature is of less
importance. At least a decision imposing restraint will obviate further litiga-
tion. And state courts are more liberal in finding a "common interest" among
claimants requesting injunctive relief.' But praying for equitable relief
Western Conn. Title & Mtg. Co., 12- Conn. 360, 23 A.2d 128 (1941) (judgment could
not be res judicata, since there was a conflict of interests over whether property shfuld
be sold; court required pr,,per notice to all, so that those with adverse interests could
appear).
149. See pages 506-09 supro.
150. See, e.g., Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Ass'n, 32 Cal. 2d 833, 840.
198 P.2d 514, 518 (1948): "[I]ndepndent research has failed to reveal a single case in
which it has been held that a representative or class suit was a proper or appropriate
vehicle for the determination of alleged tort liability of defendants to numerous named
or unascertained persons."
In United Mine Workers of America v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796, 277 S.W. 546 (1925),
the court held that the doctrine of representation is inapplicable in a suit against a
union, since equity would not take jurisdiction over a case involving a question of unliqui-
dated damages arising from a tort. See also Baskins v. United Mne Workers of America,
150 Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464 (1921).
The following cases are general examples of state judicial interpretation of the com-
munity of interest and the impracticability of joinder tests: Weaver v. Pasadena Tourna-
ment of Roses Ass'n, supra; Peterson v. Donelley, 33 Cal. App. 2d 133, 91 P2d 123
(1939) (community of interest found among beneficiaries of a voting trust) ; Coachella
Valley County Water Dist. v. Stevens. 206 Cal. 400, -74 Pac. 538 (1924) (c.,mnunit3
of interest rather than necessary party test) : Parker v. University of Delaware, 31 Del.
Ch. 381, 75 A.2d 225 (Ch. 1950) (Delaware Negroes legally interested in a determination
of their constitutional rights concerning admission to college constitute a class); Alkn
v. Avondale Co., 135 Fla. 6, 185 So. 137 (1938) (in suit by purchaser of one of 100 sub-
divided lots, to remove restrictive covenants, the defendant property omers constituted
a class) ; Macon & B.R.R. v. Stamps, 85 Ga. 1, 11 S.E. 442 (1890) (citizens of a town,
as representatives of a class, may sue to prevent the city in its corporate capacity from
using city funds for the construction of a railroad) ; QJay Spread Co. v. Hicks, 185 Ga.
507, 195 S.E. 564 (1938) (the fact that the individual interest of the plaintiffs may in some
respects differ, or that all do not have an interest in all matters embraced in the litigation,
will not render the petition multifarious as to the individual plaintiffs, or subject it to at-
tack for misjoinder of parties or causes of action, if each of the plaintiffs has an "essen-
tial" interest). But see Webb & Martin Inc. v. Anderson-McGriff Hardware Co., 183 Ga.
291, 3 S.E.2d 882 (1939). See also note 29 supra.
151. E.g., McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936); Healy
v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934); Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture
Co., 127 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942) (trade name infringement) ; cf. Rogers v. Hennepin
County, 239 U.S. 621 (1916). See also Brovn v. Trousdale, 138 U.S. 3S9 (1S91) (as-
sertion of a public right). But cf. California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California,
Inc., 162 F2d 893 (2d Cir.), cert. denicd, 332 U.S. 816 (1947).
152. See, e.g., San Francisco v. Market Street Ry., 95 Cal. App. 2d 648, 213 P.2d 780
(1950) ; Fallon v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 2d 48, 90 P.2d 858 (1939); Jellen v.
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may cause a state court to interpret the action as one requiring application
of bill of peace doctrines. In that event, claimants may hit snags which inhere
in that procedure. 15 3
RECEIVERSHIP PROCEEDINGS
One Connecticut case originated a novel method for treating mass tort
claims.' 54 Because in that state a tort claimant can attach property of the
defendant's when he files suit, allowing separate actions at law would have
doomed the defendant to bankruptcy. 55  At the request of a selected claim-
ant, the defendant's business was placed in the hands of a receiver.' The
receiver operated the business, building up reserve funds to pay legitimate
claims in full. 157 The defendant waived all affirmative defenses, and disputes
were submitted to arbitration, by which the parties agreed to be bound., 8
In most jurisdictions, however, such a procedure must stem from consent.
Every state but three denies a non-judgment creditor standing to throw
a person into receivership. 5 9 Furthermore, consent is unlikely in most
cases. Only in states where attachment may precede suit can the de-
fendant be expected to accept the stigma of receivership. Otherwise, with
his property free of attachment, the defendant can continue to operate
his business during the trial period, setting aside reserves to satisfy claims
established in court. And where the defendant does this, claimants will
probably prefer jury trial to arbitration.
CONSOLIDATION AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
Perhaps the most promising system for handling mass tort litigation has
developed recently in federal procedure through the combined use of pre-
O'Brien, 89 Cal. App. 505, 264 Pac. 115 (1928); Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist. v.
Superior Court, 182 Cal. 315, 187 Pac. 1056 (1920); Smith v. Delaware Coach Co., 31
Del. Ch. 256, 70 A.2d 257 (Ch. 1949) ; New Mission Baptist Church v. Atlanta, 200 Ga.
518, 37 S.E.2d 377 (1946) ; Kimsey v. Mickel, 191. Ga. 158, 12 S.E.2d 567 (1940) ; McIn-
tyre v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 65, 157 S.E. 499 (1931). Contra: Watson v. Santa Carmelita
Mut. Water Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 709, 137 P.2d 757 (1943) ; Material Service Corp. v.
McKibbin, 380 Ill. 226, 43 N.E.2d 939 (1942).
153. See pages 506-09 supra.
154. See Note, The Equity Receivership in Mass Tort, 60 YALE L.J. 1417 (1951)
(commenting upon the Ringling Bros., Barnum & Bailey circus fire in Hartford, Con-
necticut).
155. Id. at 1418 n.6.
Bankruptcy was inevitable because the total value of the claims asserted was greater
than the defendant's assets. In addition, defendant's property had no earning capacity
while frozen by attachment. Ibid.
156. Id. at 1418 nn.8-10.
157. Pursuant to an agreement among the parties, the assets of the circus were re-
leased during the period of arbitration. Id. at 1419.
158. Id. at 1419 n.12.
159. E.g., Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491 (1923). See Note, 60 YALE L.J.
1417, 1420-5 (1951).
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trial conferences 160 and consolidation of actions under Federal Rule 42(a).11'
The method has achieved particular success in litigation governed by a short
statute of limitations, such as that embodied in the Federal Tort Claims Act.'6"
In a recent case, Clark v. United States,163 the procedure was used to good
advantage. Here, the parties agreed to delay the trial of all actions until
the two-year statute of limitations had run.10 4 Even if agreement had not been
reached, the court could probably have delayed trial that long. Before the
limitations period expired, some seven hundred suits were filed againsit the
Government for damage caused by the collapse of a river embankment built
by the Government.'r- A total of ninety-one lawyers represented variou.
claimants.', At a meeting, these attorneys selected a committee of three
lawyers to handle the trial and pre-trial work.1 67
This litigation was not a class action. Although the feasibility of the clas,
action device was debated at a pre-trial conference, it Nwas decided that class
action was impossible; it was questionable whether any group of plaintiffs
under the Tort Claims Act could join in class litigation.0 s Instead, the
actions were consolidated.
160. For general discussion of pre-trial, see Duuglas, Pre-Trial Procedure, 26 A.B.
A.J. 693 (1940); Fee, The Lost Horizon in Pleading tndcr the Federal Rules of Cizil
Procedure, 48 CoC L. REv. 491 (1948); Fisher, Judicial .1fcdiatiou-H6ow it N*orks
Through Pre-Trial Conference, 10 U. oF CE. L. REV. 453 (1943); Murrah, A Pre-Trial
Procedure: A Statenent of Its Essentials, 14 F.R.D. 417 (1953).
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a):
"Consolidation: Separate Trials.
"(a) CONSOLIDATION. When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any tr all the
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs
or delay."
162. 63 STAT. 62 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (Supp. 1952).
163. 13 F.R.D. 342 (D. Ore. 1952).
164. Id. at 343.
165. Ibid.
166. Communication to the YALE LAW JoumpAL from Mr. Ray G. Brown, Chairman
of the Committee of Claimants' Lawyers, dated April 21, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
167. Ibid.
168. Exactly why this should be so is unclear, since the Federal Tort Claims Act
expressly provides that the courts are to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
60 STAT. 8434 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(6) (Supp. 1952). In fact, it appears that it was
Congress' intent to expedite the final settlement of all claims by including in one action
all parties directly concerned, despite technical objections to such joinder which previous-
ly might have been made. Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947).
Perhaps the doubt may have been occasioned by the fact that there is some controversy
over whether the United States may be joined with other defendants in an action under
this Act. See note 127 supra.
Certainly consolidation and extensive use of pre-trial procedure was far more effective
than a class action would have been. Probably there could not have been a true class
action in the present fact situation, and there was no way in which to force party liti-
gants to join in a spurious class action. See text at note 118 ,supra.
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Pre-trial conferences were also employed. 169 These conferences were held
in open court and recorded by a reporter. Many plaintiffs were present. 170
Eventually, twenty cases of the entire group were selected for trial. 7 ' To
assure a complete determination of all issues concerning liability, the court
directed each plaintiff whose case was not selected for trial either to draft a
proposed pre-trial order describing the issues of liability in his particular
case, or else to agree of record to accept the issues of liability set out in the
principal pre-trial order. If the plaintff chose neither of these alternatives,
his case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. 1 72
In order to gain further assurance that all possible issues of law and fact
would be litigated, the court twice reviewed briefs submitted by attorneys for
the various plaintiffs and ordered an oral argument covering the entire field
of liability. 17 3 This seems to have been successful in framing issues and in
facilitating the stipulation of many evidentiary facts not brought out in the
pleadings.
The effectiveness of the procedure in Clark was enhanced by two facts.
First, the judge was willing to make extensive use of the pre-trial conference
and to use every power at his command to force the parties to litigate model
suits. Secondly, the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the parties'
actions, since they were brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act .1 4 Mass
tort litigation over which the federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction
does not lend itself so readily to effective consolidation; here again the fact
that federal courts find themselves unable to enjoin state actions emasculates
the procedural device. But consolidation at least avoids one of the problems
raised when the class action is used. Service of process requirements do not
intrude as much. By deferring trial until the statute of limitations ran, the
Clark court eliminated that troublesome creature, the unknown claimant.
No one could file a valid claim after the limitations period had run.
169. Clark v. United States, 13 F.R.D. 342, 343-7 (D. Ore. 1952).
170. Id. at 343.
171. Id. at 344.
1.72. Ibid.
173. Ibid. The court also made a final review in order to avoid Rule 15(b), which
states that issues not raised by the pleadings are considered to have been tried through
the implied consent of the parties, and shall be considered as if they had been raised by
the pleadings. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b). The unfairness of this rule should be apparent in
a case of this nature, where model suits are being used. If an issue not raised in the
pleadings was deemed to have received an implicit adjudication, all would be bound. In
order to avoid this contingency, the court found that the issues set out in the pre-trial
order were the only ones tried, whether of fact or of law. The court further stated that
"if someone hereafter conceives that other issues were tried, the proper result would be
to send the case back for the trial of those issues rather than assuming that such issues
were tried." Clark v. United States, supra note 169, at 344.
174. 60 STAT. 842 et seq. (1946), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402,
2411, 2671-80 (Supp. 1952). See note 127 sitpra.
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State laws permitting consolidation are often less liberal than the federal
rules. They often require that consolidation be limited to the consolidation
of multiple actions between the same parties.'-, Even where state laws
put consolidation beyond reach, however, use in state court of the pre-trial
conference may be effective to a degree.'7 6 In one case arising out of a series
of wrecks on the Long Island Railroad, the Supreme Court of New York
pre-tried two hundred cases in eleven days.177 This was not the usual pre-trial
procedure, since no effort was made to narrow the issues, amend the plead-
ings, or obtain stipulations.' 7 s Because of public resentment centering on the
accidents, the issue of liability was not open to serious dispute., The primary
concern was to ascertain the extent of each claimant's damages. This the
opposing lawyers worked out for themselves, eliminating unrealistic claims
and effecting many settlements.'5s Here, it is true, the pressure of public
opinion may have forced many concessions.' s ' It was also true that nothing
more was accomplished than might have been done by the defendant itself
prior to the pre-trial conference. "' Nevertheless the impartial influence of
judicial sponsorship and supervision may have facilitated voluntary settle-
ment. At least such a procedure helps to free the courts and the parties from
the load of unnecessary litigation.18 3 Where there is pressure to settle, the
pre-trial conference may in itself be a potent tool for eliminating unneeded
controversy.
CONCLUSION
In evaluating the three major devices for simplifying mass tort litigation-
the bill of peace, the spurious class action, and the combination of consolida-
tion and pre-trial conference-the e-xtent to which each device aids the defen-
dant must be balanced against the degree to which it prevents each claimant
from obtaining a full hearing. The bill of peace favors the tort-feasor. It
forces all claimants against whom the bill issues to abide by a single decision.
Furthermore, the traditional practice of determining issues in a single repre-
sentative suit in equity gives plaintiffs little chance to choose the manner in
which their claims will be arguedY1s ' The only saving grace from the claimant's
point of view is that the bill cannot be entertained against him as long as he is un-
175. E.g., Bley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 351, 357 (S.D. Ala. 1939).
176. See Cray, The Pre-Trial in Action, 37 Iow.% L. REv. 341 (1952); Kincaid, Pre-
Trial in Our Supreme Court, 27 J. STATE BAR OF CUF. 255 (1952); Louisell, Discazry
and Pre-Trial under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MixN. L. Rv. 633, 660 (1952).
177. AmFmc&N BAR Ass'N, RETORT OF CoU.nsrrru o PnE-Tma. Pnocmun& To






183. Ibid. See also MAurrah, suPra note 160, at 420.
184. See CH,-EE 183 et seq.
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known to the defendant.18r And that very fact limits the bill's utility to defend-
ants. As a practical matter, also, relief through bills of peace may be hard to
procure. Allowing trial of damage actions by a jury-less court, while it may not
violate constitutional provisions, runs contrary to a long American tradition.',.
The spurious class action, on the other hand, is solicitous of claimants'
rights. A decision in such an action cannot bind plaintiffs who do not agree
to be bound. And even where a claimant has so agreed, the court may allow
him to protect his interests by intervening.18 7 In addition, this procedure
preserves jury trial. But, in safeguarding claimants, the spurious class action
denies the defendant any certain benefit. He cannot force claimants to enter
the action or to become bound by its outcome. Intervention may destroy the
simplicity of the suit. Most important, this procedure, like the bill of peace,
fails to cope with the problem of unknown claimants.
In contrast to both of the foregoing systems, the combination of consolida-
tion and pre-trial conference seems to strike a fair balance between the interests
of claimants and defendants. It offers the defendant a means of binding all
parties, if not to one decision, at least to one group of decisions rendered
in the same suit. 8 As employed in the Clark case, the procedure avoids
the unknown claimants problem by delaying trial until the limitations period
has run. Even if trial is commenced before that time, claimants' suits can
be incorporated as they are filed. At the same time, judge-supervised use of
the pre-trial conference affords each claimant a fair opportunity to present
his own legal and factual interpretations. 1 9 For these reasons, the consoli-
185. See text at note 108 supra.
186. See notes 74, 103 supra.
187. See note 14 supra. The privilege of being represented by counsel not of one's
own choosing, however, is not absolute in a representative suit. E.g., Schatte v. Inter-
national Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 183 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1950) : "The
general rule in class suits is that the member of the class who is the original plaintiff
retains control over the action as opposed to other members of the class who may later
seek to intervene."
188. See communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Warren E. Burger, Assist-
ant Attorney-General, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, dated April
28, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
But see Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In that case a question arose
as to the finality, for purposes of appeal, of the judgments in a large number of con-
solidated actions. These actions were being litigated through the expedient of a test case.
On appeal, all judgments, except the one in the test case (Dalehite v. United States,
supra), were not considered final; by the terms of the pre-trial order, the Government
had retained the privilege of litigating all affirmative defenses, in addition to the amount
of damages in every non-litigated case. See communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL
from Mr. Stuart Thayer, supra note 3. The case illustrates the care with which pre-trial
orders must be drawn to prevent extended litigation of issues which could be settled in
a single proceeding.
189. In this context, the pre-trial conference will be ineffectual unless it embraces the
issues raised by all or nearly all of the claims arising from the mass tort. Because use
of the pre-trial in the mass tort situation is new, lawyers may balk at plunging their
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dation and conference procedure is preferable to both the bill of peace and the
spurious class action.19 0
Regardless of how justly the procedural devices reconcile defendants' and
claimants' conflicting interests, their usefulness is limited by current doctrines.
No court can issue service of process in an in pcrsona action to a non-resi-
dent outside its jurisdiction."' And no court can effectively enjuin an in
personani action pending in another jurisdiction.19' Despite these limitations,
procedural devices can achieve some simplification of mass tort litigation.
Frequently, many claims stemming from one tort are filed in a single juris-
diction.19 3 By taking advantage of procedural simplification in each jurisdic-
tion, the mass tort defendant could at least reduce the number of suits to one
per jurisdiction. But even then the defendant may face the burdensome task
of defending several complex suits, and those suits may still produce different
results.
In order to approach their goal of obtaining a complete adjudication in
one proceeding. mass tort defendants must look to Congress.1' 4 The limita-
tions presently imposed on state jurisdiction are constitutional; no legislatiun
can remove them. 95  But the present limits of federal court pjuwer are set
clients' claims into such a procedure. The Clark court dealt with hesitancy by dismiss-
ing claims of those who refused to participate in pre-trial conference. See text at notes
171-2 supra. Should a court consider dismissal to drastic, it could still coerce unco-
operative parties by taxing them for the costs sustained by their opponents and attribu-
table to litigation of issues which should have been stipulated at the pre-trial stage. But
dismissal does not seem unduly harsh, in light of the opportunity given to claimants to
make their own arguments at the pre-trial proceedings. See text at notes 172-3 supra.
190. Courts might obviate the unmovn claimant's problem in the biil of peace pro-
cedure by delaying the single suit until the limitations period runs-just as the Clark
case did. But no bill of peace case has been found in which this was dune. And, unlil:e
the bill of peace, the consolidation procedure preserves jury trial, in accordance with
American judicial policy. See note 20 supra. In addition, the bill of peace does not protect
claimants' rights so fully. See page 503 supra.
191. See notes 30-1 supra.
192. See note 48 supra.
193. See, e.g., In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F2d 771 (5th Cir. 1951),
aff'd sub norn. Dalelite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
194. "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and existing legislation do not provide
a satisfactory solution of the problems presented by the legal controversies arising out of
accidents such as the South Amboy explosion. They are controversies in which the
common questions of law and fact should be tried in une action in which every individual
and corporation accused of liability and the United States could be joined, in which all
claimants could be represented and in which all the evidence could be presented. Such a
result, however, cannot be achieved unless Congress modifies, in this unusual type of
situation, the requirements of complete diversity of citizenship, allows service of summons
outside of the district wherein the court hearing the case sits, and permits a federal court
to enjoin all other suits arising out of the same occurrence." Pennsylvania R.R. v. United
States, 111 F. Supp. 84, 91 (D.NJ. 1952).
195. There is one exception. Absent statutory authority, most state courts hold that
they are not bound to respect an injunction issued by another state. See t'o ,icu, op. cit.
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by statute. If it wished, Congress could grant federal courts the authority
to enjoin concurrent in personam actions pending in state courts.,, And
it could provide that in the mass tort situation service of process will be
valid throughout the United States, not merely in the district of the court in
which the action was brought. 197 By making these statutory changes, Con-
gress would pave the way for determination in one proceeding of almost all
claims resulting from a mass tort.
Some claims, of course. should be left to the states. Most mass tort claim.
will be subject to federal jurisdiction because the parties have diverse citizen-
ship. But state courts should adjudicate claims where there is no requisite
diversity among any of the parties or other ground for federal jurisdiction.
Moreover, standard conflicts of law doctrine requires all courts to apply the
law of the state where the tort was committed.1 98 And the Erie doctrine binds
federal courts to respect state conflicts rules in diversity cases. 199 Hence where
federal jurisdiction is based on diversity and the law of the state of the tort is
unsettled, it would seem wise to allow at least one suit to proceed in that state.-"t3
But apart from these limited exceptions, congressional action can pave the way
for speedy and economical, yet equitable, litigation in one federal proceeding
of all the claims stemming from a mass tort.
supra note 51, at 642 n.148. Presumably, widespread state legislation could effectuate
a uniform system of reciprocal enforcement. But such a possibility seems remote. And
state courts would still be hampered by constitutional doctrines concerning service of
process.
196. Howard v. United States, 126 F.2d 667, 668 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
699 (1942), discussed in note 30 supra.
197. See note 30 supra.
198. GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 51, c. 6.
199. Id. at 33-45.
200. The alleged tort may involve as yet unresolved issues of law of the state of
the tort's situs, or issues which though already adjudicated in that state are suspect since
subesquent decisions have given every indication that if again presented to that state's
highest court, those very issues would be decided differently. For examples of the guessing
game federal judges must play when Erie bids them to respect state law but state precedent
is equivocal or lacking, see King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153
(1948); Sunbeam Corp. v. Civil Service Employees' Cooperative Ass'n, 187 F.2d 768
(3d Cir. 1951). Apparently, the game will end only upon an authoritative decision by the
state's highest court. See Cooper v. American Air Lines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945).
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